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NOTES & COMMENTS
INJUNCTIONS-UNJUST RESTRAINT ON
ENTERTAINERS IN CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Hollywood is a town built on dreams. Young actors and musi-
cians hone their skills for years, waiting for that one big brepk that will
make them a star. When an artist' gets a chance to sign his first big
contract, he often sees it as the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow,
rather than as a document that will bind him for many years. Even if
he is not blinded by the promise of untold fame and fortune, he often
finds himself in an inferior bargaining position. A company can choose
from many hopeful young talents while an individual artist may see an
offer by one company as his only chance to be signed. He may be
afraid to scare the company away with a tough negotiating stance,
often accepting a contract with very unfavorable terms,
In the years following, the artist can become more successful and
may realize that his contract does not fairly compensate him for his
services. Companies are also quite aware of changes in an artist's stat-
ure, and will often renegotiate his contract in good faith.2 However,
the parties can disagree about the artist's worth, causing the renegoti-
ation process to break down. In such cases, many artists simply cease
to perform their contractual obligations. Under California law, the art-
ist cannot be forced to perform. However, the company may get a
1. In this comment, the term "artist" will be used to refer to all entertainers including
actors, both television and film, and recording musicians and singers.
2. Most entertainment cases never reach a trial court, and even fewer reach a court of
appeal or the California Supreme Court. See Tusher, Troubled Tandem Hails Warning to
Ba/kr Stars, HOLLYWOOD REP., June 5, 1975, at I (observation by producer Norman Lear
that networks usually renegotiate actors' contracts even when demands are qnreasonable).
But see Tandem Prods., Inc. v. Struthers, No. C 126009 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed July 2, 1975).
reported in HOLLYWOOD REP., June 9, 1975, at I (producer Lear himself pnable to renegoti-
ate with actress Sally Struthers).
See also Frackman, Failure to Pay Wages and Termination ofEntertainment Contracts in
California, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 333, 335 & n.9 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Fraqkman].
3. The obligation to perform under the terms of a personal service contract cannot be
enforced by specific performance in California. The California Supreme Court has stated:
[lI]t would be an invasion of one's statutory liberty to compel him to work for, or tp
remain in the personal service of, another. It would place him in a cpndition of
involuntary servitude-a condition which the supreme law of the land declares
shall not exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
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court to issue a prohibitory injunction preventing the artist from per-
forming for any of its competitors.
Neither the artist nor the company wants the dispute to reach this
point. The artist does not want to be prevented from earning a living,
and realizes that time spent out of the spotlight can hurt his earning
power.' The employer wants a prompt, amicable settlement because a
disgruntled or inactive artist can cut into both company profits and
prestige.6
This comment focuses on the availability of an injunction to a
company after the negotiations break down. In California, no injunc-
tion may be issued if a company has "wilfully or materially" breached
its obligation,7 or if the employee has not been guaranteed a minimum
of at least $6,000 compensation per annum. An injunction is limited
Poultry Producers of S. Cal., Inc. v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 288, 208 P. 93, 97 (1922).
4. The right of an employer to seek a prohibitory injunction against an employee which
prevents her from performing for an employer's competitor was first recognized in the
landmark case of Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 867 (Ch. 1852). In this case, an opera
singer refused to perform under her contract to sing exclusively at one opera house. Al-
though specific .performance was not granted, the court enjoined her from singing at another
opera house.
A court will not issue a preliminary injunction unless it finds that the employer would
be more likely than not to win the trial on the merits. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Holden,
166 F. Supp. 684, 691 (S.D. Cal. 1958). The major purpose of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo pending a final judgment in the action. Environmental Coalition of
Orange County, Inc. v. AVCO Community Developers, Inc., 40 Cal. App. 3d 513, 521, 115
Cal. Rptr. 59, 63 (1974); Keith v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 521, 524, 103 Cal. Rptr.
314, 316 (1972).
But see Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction 6 CORNELL L.Q. 235 (1921) (pro-
hibitory injunctions coerce employee to go back to work and force involuntary servitude).
5. See Laurel Canyon, Ltd. v. Springsteen, 55 A.D.2d 882, 391 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1977).
An injunction restrained rock star Bruce Springsteen from recording shortly after he ap-
peared as the cover story subject in both Time and Newsweek the same week, and his last
album had sold over 1,000,000 copies. McGee, Bruce Springsteen Reclaims the Future, Roll-
ing Stone, August 11, 1977, at 11, col. 1. The injunction was obtained by Springsteen's
manager when Springsteen attempted to have Jon Landau produce the next album. Spring-
steen's manager Qbtained a preliminary injunction enjoining Springsteen, CBS and Landau
from producing a recording. N.Y.L.J., August 25, 1976, at 6. col. 1. As a result, Springsteen
was unable to take full advantage of the fame he had achieved.
6. See Street Legal, Cashbox, June 10, 1978, at 3, col. 1. It may be that, when a record
company and an artist become involved in a long legal battle, only their attorneys profit.
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2925 (West 1971):
An employment for a specified term may be terminated by the employee at any
time in case of any wilful or permanent breach. of the obligations of his employer to
him as an employee.
Because the California Labor Code provides that an employee can unilaterally termi-
nate his employment if his employer wilfully or materially breached its contractual obliga-
tions, it is clear that no court would issue injunctions in such a situation.
8. Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1966).
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to the term of the contract,9 and, by statute, in no case longer than
seven years.' 0
These laws do not necessarily provide an artist adequate protec-
tion. The courts have not clearly defined what constitutes a "wilful or
permanent" breach by the employer." The $6,000 minimum annual
.compensation requirement does not provide a living wage in the cur-
rent inflated economy, 2 and is not defacto guaranteed because courts
often inaccurately value the guaranteed minimum compensation pro-
vided by a contract.' 3 The limitations on the duration of an injunction
are probably ineffective, because an artist's career can easily be de-
stroyed during this period. 4
The solutions to these problems are: (1) more comprehensive
opinions by the appellate courts, establishing clearer standards of duty
for both parties; (2) raising the level of minimum compensation re-
quired, by adjusting it periodically to an inflation index and assuring
an artist that the new figure will be guaranteed; and (3) shortening the
duration an injunction may remain in force against an artist.
II. RESTRICTIONS ON ISSUANCE OF INJUNCTIONS
An injunction is typically sought by the company whenever an art-
ist tries to assert his statutory right to terminate a contract for any wil-
ful or permanent breach or failure to provide $6,000 minimum
compensation. Courts will not issue an injunction unless the party
seeking the injunction is more likely than not to win at a trial on the
merits." Thus, the right to terminate a contract for breach of obliga-
9. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766, 773, 192 P.2d 949, 953 (1948); MCA
Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90 Cal. App. 3d 18, 24, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 (1979).
10. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1971); see De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 67
Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944).
1I. See notes 21-40 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 52-66 and accompanying text infra.
14. R. DENISOFF, SOLID GOLD: THE POPULAR RECORD INDUSTRY 110 (975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as DENISOFF].
15. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Holden, 166 F. Supp. 684, 689-91 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 525 (West 1970):
An injunction is a writ or order requiring a person to refrain from a particular act.
It may be granted by the court in which the action is brought, or by a judge thereof;
and when granted by a judge, it may be enforced as an order of the court.
The United States Supreme Court has written:
There is no power, the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater
caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in the doubtful
case, than the issuing of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity, that never
ought to be extended, unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot
afford an adequate and commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be
1981]
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tions is interwoven with an employer's use of the injunction remedy.
Injunctions are used by a company to enforce an exclusivity clause
or suspension clause of a contract with an artist. These contract provi-
sions are contained in a contract solely for the benefit of an employer.
An exclusivity clause is a negative covenant contained in a per-
sonal service contract, I6 which is strictly construed, 7 to provide that an
artist will not perform for another employer engaged in the same enter-
prise during the contract term. A suspension clause permits an em-
ployer to halt the operation of a personal service contract in the event
clear, the injury impending, and threatened so as to be averted only by the protect-
ing preventive process of injunction.
Truly v. Wanzer, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 141, 142-43 (1847).
The issuance of a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion of the trial court.
Weingard v. Atlantic Savings & Loan Assn, I Cal. 3d 806, 464 P.2d 106, 83 Cal. Rptr. 650
(1970).
The sole function of an injunction is to preserve the status quo between the parties until
the final judgment in an action. Keith v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 521. 103 Cal. Rptr.
314 (1972).
The party seeking the injunction has the duty to prosecute the action in a reasonable
period of time. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 581(a), 583 (West 1970).
In the entertainment industry, injunctions are not always necessary to prevent artists
from working for someone else. A warning to prospective bidders from an artist's company
of a possible lawsuit for tortious interference with contractual relations often has the same
effect on the artist as an injunction. See Note, Statutory Minimum Compensation and the
Granting ofInjunctive Relief to Enforce Personal Service Contracts in the Entertainment Indus-
tries: The Need/or Legislative Reform, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 489, 492 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as Minimum Compensation].
However, this is not always the case. When rock artist Tom Petty was in a battle with
his record company, several other competitive labels made lucrative offers to him. Some
even offered to cover the legal costs that Petty would incur during the prolonged legal battle.
Jackson, Tom Petys Rock Victory, BAM, December 14, 1979, at 25, col. I. See notes 39-40
and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the Petty case.
16. In the early English cases, there was some controversy as to whether such a clause
was actually required to bind an employee solely to an employer during the term of a con-
tract. It is now established in most U.S. jurisdictions that the promise of an employee not to
render services to another employer is implied in the personal service contract. See I I S.
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1449, at 1039-40 (3d ed. 1968); 2 CAL. JUR. 3d 4ctors § 8, at
17-18.
Nevertheless, most artist's personal service contracts contain lengthy exclusivity clauses.
One such clause reads:
From the date hereof and so long as this agreement remains in force, Artist will not
perform for the purpose of making phonograph records for any person other than
XYZ, and Artist will not authorize or permit use of Artist's name, likeness or iden-
tification, voice or sound effects, or performance for in connection with the produc-
tion, sale, distribution, advertising, publicity or exploitation of phonograph records
by or for any person other than XYZ.
17. See Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 678, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (1969).
"[Any agreement that limits a person's ability to follow his or her vocation must be strictly
construed."
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specified conditions occur.'" This right is a contractual creation. It
does not exist at common law and is not granted by statute.' 9 During
the temporary suspension of the contract, an artist is prevented from
working for another employer, and the term of the artist's obligation is
extended by an amount equivalent to the length of the suspension. 20
Therefore, if an artist asserts statutory protection against a com-
pany, he may expect that company to seek to suspend the term of the
contract.
18. A typical suspension clause follows:
We [the Company] shall have the right, at our election, to suspend the term of this
contract and our obligations hereunder upon written notice to you [the Artist] if for
any reason ... [an exhaustive list of reasons is given] .... Such suspension shall
be for the duration of any such event or contingency, and, unless we notify you to
the contrary in writing, the term hereof (whether the initial term or any renewal
term hereof) during which such event or contingency shall have commenced shall
be automatically extended by such number of days as equal the total number of
days of any such suspension. During any such suspension you shall not render
your services as a recording artist to any other person. firm or corporation.
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS OF THE RECORD INDUSTRY
127. 141 (1978) (Elektra/Asylum Artist Term Contract).
19. See Youngman. Negotiation of Personal Service Contracts, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 2. 11
(1954).
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that a clause that suspended a
screenwriter without pay, and prevented him from working for another employer was void.
Loew's. Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951). The
court ruled that such a restriction was an improper restraint of trade under CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964) ("Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business is to that
extent void"). 185 F.2d at 657.
However, most cases do not address the applicability of section 16600 to personal serv-
ice contracts, and a commentator stated that Loew's should not be interpreted to mean that
exclusivity clauses cannot be enforceable during suspension periods. Tannenbaum, Enforce-
ment of Personal Service Contractsin the Entertainment Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18, 24-25
(1954).
The Loew's case is distinguishable because it involved the enforcement of a "morality
clause" which is conceptually different from an exclusivity clause. The clause in the Loew's
case stated that the artist could be suspended if he "commit[ted] any act that will tend to
degrade him in society or bring into public hatred, contempt, scorn or ridicule .... " 185
F.2d at 645. A morality clause is different from an exclusivity clause because when an em-
ployer invokes a morality clause the artist is completely willing to perform for his employer
but is prevented from doing so. When an employer invokes an exclusivity clause, an artist is
trying to perform for another employer. See Horowitz, Legal Aspects of "Political Black
Listing" in the Entertainment Industry, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (1956).
20. A suspension clause cannot extend an artist's obligation beyond seven years from the
date of signing of the original agreement. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 67 Cal.
App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944) (construing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1971) (seven
year limitation on personal service obligation)).
The suspension is limited to the term of the contract if it is for a term of less than seven
years. MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90 Cal. App. 3d 18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1979).
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JO URNAL
A. Section 2925 of the Labor Code
Traditionally, the right to terminate a contract was restricted to
contracts where the other party's breach was "material." 2' However,
section 2925 of the California Labor Code additionally provides that
an employee may terminate his service to an employer "at any time"
there is a "wilful and permanent" breach of the employer's contractual
obligations.22 Section 2925 was enacted long after the concept of mate-
riality became entrenched in the common law,23 so it is doubtful that
the legislature meant merely to codify the common law requirement.
For example, at common law, after substantial performance, a slight
breach that did not go to the root of a contract would not justify termi-
nation.24 However, the language of section 2925 seems to justify termi-
nation of the contract at any time so long as the breach is wilful and
permanent. 25 The statute appears to be a refinement of the common
law rule.
One recent commentator argued that by enacting section 2925, the
legislature chose to give the employee unique rights, apart from the
common law materiality requirement. Since the employment relation-
ship is of public concern, the legislature enacted section 2925 to give
employees measurably greater protection. 26 The Labor Code includes
many other specific statutes that are carefully designed to protect the
21. See II S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1292, at 8-11 (3d ed. 1968).
The facts used to determine whether a breach is "material" include: the timing of the
breach in relation to the duration of the contract (the earlier the breach, the more likely it
will be material), the importance of the breach in relation to the object of the contract, the
extent to which the party failing to perform has already performed. and whether the remedy
of money damages would be adequate to compensate the party. I B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts § 620, at 528-29 (8th ed. 1973).
22. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2925 (West 1971.) supra note 7. Generally, when the concept of
"wilful breach" is relied upon, the breach must not only be wilful but also "material in
character and extent." 6 A. CORBIN, CORIN ON CONTRACTS § 1254, at 17 (1962).
However, section 2925 states that an employee may terminate a contract "any time"
there is "a wilful or permanent" breach. There is no requirement of "materiality.'..
23. See I B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 620, at 529-29 (8th
ed. 1973) (traces history of materiality doctrine).
24. E.g. Rischard v. Miller, 182 Cal. 351, 188 P. 50 (1920).
25. Generally, "any wilful or permanent breach" will be deemed by a court to be "mate-
rial." Therefore, even though they may be conceptually different, their practical applica-
tions are probably the same. See generally Frackman, supra note 2, at 348-49.
26. See id at 349 n.69. "[T]he rule of law is well established that where the legislature
uses terms already judicially construed, 'the presumption is almost irresistible that it used
them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by.the courts.'"
City of Long Beach v. Marshall, II Cal. 2d 609, 620, 82 P.2d 362, 367 (1938) (quoting City of
Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal. 2d 184, 191, 44 P.2d 305, 309 (1935)).
[Vol. I
INJUNCTIONS ON ENTERTAINERS
wage earner.27 It is reasonable then to conclude that section 2925 was
also intended to give the employee protection not found at common
law.
The issue of whether an employer may invoke an injunction
against an employee seeking to terminate a contract under section 2925
has never been litigated. The only entertainment law case involving
section 2925 rights unfortunately did not address the issue of the avail-
ability of an injunction to an employer. 28 In Bumgarner, the plaintiff,
actor James Garner, contracted with Warner Bros. in 1955 to appear in
a weekly television series, "Maverick."29 The contract contained a
standardforce majeure clause.3" The force majeure clause in the Gar-
ner contract stated that Garner could be suspended without pay if
"preparation, production, or completion of motion pictures" was ham-
pered by certain factors, including strikes.3 A strike was called by the
Writers Guild of America West, and Warner Bros. notified Garner that
his pay would be suspended until the strike was settled, because no
scripts were available.3 2 Garner objected to the suspension, demanded
his salary, and declared the contract terminated when Warner Bros.
refused to pay.33 Rather than seeking an injunction against Garner,
Warner Bros. filed an action for declaratory relief claiming that the
contract was not breached.34
The trial court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that aforce
majeure did not exist, and therefore Warner Bros. had wilfully and
27. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 204b, 206. 209, 226, 227.5 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
These sections provide for payment of undisputed amounts in the event a dispute exists with
respect to other portions of the wage, payment for previously earned wages in the event of a
strike, an itemized statement to accompany payment and, in certain instances, the weekly
payment of wages.
28. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Bumgarner. 197 Cal. App. 2d 331. 17 Cal. Rptr. 171
(1961).
29. Id at 334. 17 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
30. Id at 334 n.2, 17 Cal. Rptr. 173 n.2. The term "force majeure" means literally supe-
rior or irresistible force. It is an "insuperable interference occurring without the party's
intervention [that]. . . could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence. diligence.
and care." Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 238, 174 P.2d 441.447
(1946).
Force majeure clauses have been inserted into entertainment contracts for many years.
E.g. Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 144, 149-50, 180 P.2d 888, 892 (1947).
31. 197 Cal. App. 2d at 334 n.2, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 173 n.2.
32. Id at 335, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
33. Id
34. Id at 336. 17 Cal. Rptr. at 174. Warner Bros. claimed that Garner's suspension was
justified because of the force majeure clause, and that even if reliance on the force majeure
clause was unjustified, it was done in good faith.
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permanently breached its obligation to pay Garner.35
The California Supreme Court did not have to address the impor-
tant issue of whether an employer would be permitted to obtain an
injunction against an artist to enforce an exclusivity clause during a
suspension period, since Garner did not seek other employment during
the litigation.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a contract that pro-
hibits an artist from working for another employer during a suspension
period is an unlawful restraint of trade.3 6 The New York Court of Ap-
peals (interpreting California law) has also held that such a restraint is
void.3 1 Commentators have argued that these cases do not render ex-
clusivity clauses invalid during all suspension periods. 38 However, un-
til a California court rules on this issue, artists must be careful when
signing contracts. A clause containing the express provision that an
artist may perform for another employer during such a suspension pe-
riod will provide artists with adequate protection. In the absence of
such a clause, an artist is subject to periods of inactivity through either
an exclusivity clause or an injunction.
1. Improper assignment
The California courts have not yet ruled on whether an improper
assignment of an artist's contract by an employer is a willful and per-
manent breach under section 2925. Generally, rights may not be as-
signed which would require the obligor to perform personal services for
anyone other than the original obligee. 39 The custom in the entertain-
ment industry is that such a right does not exist without a specific
clause granting that privilege. This issue has never been litigated be-
cause the parties usually settle their disputes out of court.
A recent example involved musician Tom Petty. Petty's record la-
bel (ABC) was purchased by MCA. Petty argued that his contract was
not assignable because there was no clause in his contract permitting
35. Id at 350-53, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 183-85. The finding that a force majeure did not exist
was based on the finding that Warner Bros. continued to produce other films during Gar-
ner's suspension. Id at 342, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 178. The finding of bad faith was based on the
fact that, while Warner Bros. was planning to suspend Garner, but before it had told him, it
requested him to make a guest appearance on another show. Id at 348, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
36. Loew's, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 954 (1951),
See note 18 supra.
37. Radosh v. Shipstad, 20 N.Y.2d 504, 231 N.E.2d 759, 285 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1967).
38. See, e.g. Berman & Rosenthal, Enforcement of Personal Serpice Contracts in the En-
tertainment Industry: Part I.: Specific Enforcement, J. BEVERLY HILLS B.A., Sept. 1973, at
49, 58.
39. See Davis v. Basalt Rock Co., 107 Cal. App. 2d 436, 237 P.2d 338 (1951).
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the assignment. MCA argued that the contract was assignable, and
that it had purchased ABC specifically to obtain the Petty, Jimmy Buf-
fett, and the Steely Dan record catalogues.4" Since the matter was set-
tled out of court, artists and employers are still uncertain whether
improper assignment allows invocation of section 2925.
B. Section 3423 of the Ciil Code4  & Section 526 of the Civil
Procedure Code
42
California Civil Procedure Code section 526 and Civil Code sec-
tion 3423 together prohibit the issuance of a prohibitory injunction if
the employee is not guaranteed in writing a minimum of $6,000 per
year compensation. 3 Although the statutes were enacted in 1919, no
appellate court interpreted the statute for another 47 years." What has
emerged in the cases since then is: (1) that $6,000 guaranteed compen-
sation per year is not guaranteed; and (2) even if $6,000 were guaran-
teed, it would not be an adequate minimum compensation.
The issue of $6,000 minimum annual compensation has not arisen
often in the motion picture or television industries. 5 Most of these
40. Jackson, Tom Petty's Rock Victory, BAM, December 14, 1979, at 25, col. 1.
Petty balked at the assignment because he did not wish to remain under the terms of the
old ABC deal under which he would receive no songwriting royalties prior to the release of
his fourth album. Furthermore, he claimed that the contract had been breached because it
contained a clause which gave Petty the right to "consult and cooperate in the process of
selecting another record company to distribute [Petty's recordings" in the event ABC could
no longer do so. See Gilmore, Tom Petty's Real Lfe Nightmares, Rolling Stone, February
21, 1980, at 12, col. I.
41. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3423(5) (West 1970):
An injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract, other than a
contract in writing for the rendition or furnishing of personal services from one to
another where the minimum compensation for such service is at the rate of not less
than six thousand dollars per annum and where the service is of a special, unique,
unusual, extraordinary or intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value the
loss of which cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an
action at law ...
42. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 526(5) (West 1970) (contains virtually the same provisions
as section 3423 of the Civil Procedure Code).
43. The services provided must be of a "special, unique, unusual, extraordinary or intel-
lectual character." Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 235-36, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896, 904
(1966). Compliance with the Statute of Frauds for personal service contracts for more than
one year is also required. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 87 Cal. App. 2d 620, 197 P.2d
580 (1948).
The requirement that the services be unique reflects the common law rules. See J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16-5, at 585-86 (2d ed. 1977). If the
services are not unique, then a remedy at law for damages is appropriate. See 5A A.
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1209, at 416-17 (1964).
44. Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1966).
45. An actor signed an exclusive contract with one studio. The studio nurtured the ac-
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cases have involved artists in the recording industry, which has grown
geometrically in recent years.46
As noted, Foxx v. Williams" was the first appellate court interpre-
tation of the minimum compensation requirement. The trial court is-
sued an injunction preventing comedian Redd Foxx from recording for
any other record company for the duration of the contract between
Foxx and Dootone Records, provided that the royalties earned by Foxx
equaled or exceeded $3,000 during each six-month period.48 Foxx re-
fused to record for Dootone from the day he filed his action. However,
Foxx had previously recorded and delivered enough masters to
Dootone to satisfy the minimum number of sides required by his con-
tract. 9 In reviewing that recording contract, the court reasoned that
the royalty payments due Foxx were entirely contingent upon sales,
and therefore he was not guaranteed the annual payment of $6,000.
tor, telling him which pictures he would appear in. At the studio's sole discretion, it could
"loan-out" the actor in return for favors or another actor. Obviously, issues of involuntary
servitude were involved under this system, but rarely did the $6,000 minimum compensation
requirement become a contested issue. See Universal Pictures Co. v. Cummings, 62 F.
Supp. 611 (S.D. Cal. 1944), a.f'd, 150 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1945).
The star system broke down in the early 1950's when the government initiated anti-trust
proceedings against the studios forcing them to divest ownership in theatres. Since they no
longer needed product to fill their own theatres, they stopped entering long-term exclusive
contracts. For example, before the divestment, Clark Gable might be signed to a $500,000
contract and make five or six films each year. After the divestment, he would only make
about two or three films each year, so the studios negotiated individual picture deals. A.
KNIGHT, THE LIVELIEST ART 289-94 (rev. ed. 1979).
The minimum compensation issue rarely arises in episodic television because a series
runs 26 episodes peryear. With Screen Actors Guild requirements for minimum compensa-
tion, it is virtually impossible for this issue to arise.
See Comment, Messersmith Decision and the 1976 Basic Agreements: Baseballs Emanci-
pation Proclamation, 46 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 239 (1977), for a discussion of the baseball
contract system which was similar to the old movie "star system," and the effect of free
agency upon it.
46. In 1974, United States revenues of the recording industry exceeded $2 billion while
the movie industry garnered only $1.6 billion. S. CHAPPLE & R. GAROFALO, ROCK 'N'
ROLL is HERE TO PAY xi (1977) [hereinafter cited as CHAPPLE & GAROFALO).
In 1977 U.S. record sales rose to an all time high of $3.5 billion. Kireby, RIAA Reports
$3.5 Billion Industry Sales.: 1977 Figures are 28% ncerease Over '76, Variety, July 7, 1978, at
1, col. 4.
47. 244 Cal. App. 2d 223, 52 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1966). The dispute in Foxx arose when
Redd Foxx maintained that he was not being paid the royalties due him under the terms of
the contract. The court of appeal found this suspicion to be unwarranted. Id at 231-35, 52
Cal. Rptr. at 901-03.
48. Id at 230, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 900-01.
49. The contract stated that Foxx was required to deliver a minimum of twelve 78-RPM
reco'd sides. He had satisfied this requirement because he had already delivered sixteen
long playing records, twenty-six extended play records, and five singles. Id at 229, 52 Cal.
Rptr. at 899.
INJUNCTIONS ON ENTERTAINERS
Deciding in Foxx's favor, the court interpreted the legislative in-
tent of the statutes:
An injunction which forbids an artist to accept new employ-
ment may be a harsh and powerful remedy. The monetary
limitation in the statute is intended to serve as a counter-
weight in balancing the equities. The Legislature has con-
cluded that an artist who is not entitled to receive a minimum
of $6,000 per year by performing his contract should not be
subjected to this kind of economic coercion. Under the statu-
tory scheme, an artist who is enjoined from accepting new
employment will at least have the alternative of earning
$6,000 or more per year by performing his old contract.50
Although a commentator suggested that Foxx left many questions
unanswered, 5 thirteen years passed before the appellate court had oc-
casion to readdress this area.
In MCA Records, Inc. P. Newton-John,52 Olivia Newton-John had
a recording contract with MCA to record two albums per year for two
years, plus MCA had the option to receive two more albums for each of
three additional option periods. Newton-John delivered the first three
recordings on schedule, but the fourth recording was delivered late.
MCA exercised its first option, but did not receive another recording
from Newton-John. The contract stipulated that if Newton-John failed
to deliver a recording, MCA was entitled to extend the contract.5 3 In
return, Newton-John was to receive royalties from the sale of records,
and a nonreturnable advance of $250,000 for each recording received
during the initial two year period, and $100,000 for each recording
made during the option years.54 Under the terms of the contract,
Newton-John received approximately $2,500,000 in royalties from
50. Id at 236, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (emphasis added).
51. Schlesinger, Six Thousand Dollars Per Year, J. BEVERLY HILLS B.A., Dec. 1968 at
25, 26.
52. 90 Cal. App. 3d 18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1979).
53. Id at 21, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
54. Id
The payment of advances to artists reflects the changing business practices of the record
companies. In the past, record companies would give artists an advance as the salary. The
recording costs as well as the advance were deducted from the royalties that the artists
earned from the sale of their records.
However, the record companies found that the artists often spent the money and did not
produce any recordings so the advance payment to the artist was tied to the delivery of the
master recording. The record company still deducted the cost of the recording and the ad-
vance payment from the royalties the artists earned from the sale of albums.
The current record company practice, which was also the procedure by which Olivia
Newton-John was paid, is to pay the artist an advance out of which the recording costs are
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MCA.5 '
Both parties filed breach of contract actions against the other and
sought injunctive relief. MCA obtained a preliminary injunction to
prevent Newton-John from working outside MCA, and Newton-John
appealed. 6 Newton-John alleged that the preliminary injunction was
improper because: (1) her contract failed to guarantee payment of a
minimum of $6,000 per year compensation; and (2) since she was al-
ready suspended she could not be restrained from engaging in her oc-
cupation.57
The court of appeal upheld the findings of the trial court and con-
cluded: (1) the minimum compensation guaranteed by the statutes
does not mean "net profits"; and (2) even if it did, suitable recordings
could be made which would guarantee Newton-John $6,000 minimum
compensation.5" The court stated:
It is decisive here that under the terms of the agreement exclu-
sive control of production costs remained in defendant's
hands at all times. Defendant was free to record in as tight-
fisted or as open-handed a manner, costwise, as she chose.
Defendant's interpretation of the minimum compensation
statutes would allow her to nullify her contract at any time
merely by increasing her production expenses, which at all
times remained under her exclusive control. We do not be-
lieve the legislature intended to sanction such a one-sided bar-
gain .... 59
The court distinguished the case from Foxx because Foxx's sole com-
pensation was in the form of royalties contingent upon sales, while
Newton-John received royalties and nonreturnable advances.
60
Newton-John received a $200,000 album fund to produce two
records, out of which $6,000 was treated by the court as minimum com-
pensation. The court made a factual determination that the remaining
$194,000 ($97,000 for each record) was sufficient to produce "suitable
recordings."'6' The court failed to establish a clearcut standard, i.e.,
whether "suitable recordings" means adequate recordings, or highly
paid. The thinking of the record companies is that if the artists themselves use the advance
money to pay for recording costs, they will be more likely to hold such costs down.
55. 90 Cal. App. 3d at 21, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
56. Id
57. Id at 22, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id at 22-23, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
61. Id at 22, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
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professional recordings that match an artist's stature.62
The Newton-John decision establishes a dangerous precedent for
artists not as fortunate as Olivia. Suppose an artist ieceives $30,000 to
produce a recording plus future royalties against sales. Assume further
that either the reasonable recording costs exceed $30,000, or aforce
majeure occurs such as a strike by the distribution company or a fire
which destroys the master recording after an artist has delivered it.
63
Under the California law as it stands after Newton-John, the artist
might not receive any money at all for a given year, or actually lose
money. But as the court ruled in Foxx, the proper issue is whether
compensation to an artist is explicitly and unambiguously guaranteed,
not whether the artist actually receives $6,000 compensation.'
Some record companies now include a clause in the contract which
states explicitly that an artist is guaranteed $6,000 minimum compensa-
61tion per year. These clauses often contain provisions which allow the
record company to modify the agreement at its election to guarantee
such minimum compensation." The effectiveness of such a modifica-
62. See Wallace, Warner Bros. May Issue Fewer Albums, Rolling Stone, Mar. 8, 1979, at
10, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Wallace]. The average cost of producing an album is between
$100,000 and $150,000.
Suppose that an artist signs a long term contract for what at the time was a "reason-
able" advance. Inflation caused by higher minimum payments required by musician unions
and more lavish and advanced recording technology required to produce a comptive prod-
uct raise the cost to produce a "reasonable" recording above what the artist actually receives.
Is the artist deemed to have received $6,000 minimum compensation, even though he may
be paying for the recording costs out of his own pocket? This problem has not been ad-
dressed by the court. A court might find the "guarantee" illusory and refuse to allow the
"harsh and powerful remedy" of an injunction. Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d at 236,
52 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
63. See note 30 supra.
64. 244 Cal. App. 2d at 236, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
65. One such clause reads:
Company hereby guarantees Artist compensation for Artist's exclusive recording
services at the rate of at least Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000) per annum; and to the
extent monies are payable to Artist in advance, Company may withhold a reserve
therefrom for such payments to Artist.
THE BARRISTERS OF THE BEVERLY HILLS BAR AssociATION, COMMITTEE FOR THE ARTS,
THE MUSICIAN'S MANUAL 164, 178 (M. Halloran ed. 1979) (Warner Bros. Artist Term Con-
tract) [hereinafter cited as MUSICIAN'S MANUAL].
See Minimum Compensation, supra note 16, at 512. Inserting a separate contractual
term providing for payment of $6,000 per year satisfies the minimum compensation require-
ment. However, Newton-John's contract did not contain such a clause.
Even if such a clause were added to an artist's contract, a court should consider whether
suitable masters could be made for the advance minus the $6,000 the contract stated was for
an artist's minimum compensation. The standard should be whether the albums could be
"reasonably" produced for the advance received.
66. One such clause reads:
If California law is hereafter amended to provide for a different minimum coin-
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tion provision has not been tested by the courts.
The effect of the Newton-John decision upon the recording indus-
try has been tremendous. Although record companies on the whole
tend to be highly profitable businesses, seventy percent of all recordings
released lose money.67 A common record company strategy is to re-
lease records by many artists in the hope that a few "monster" suc-
cesses will generate the enormous income necessary to cover the bulk of
losers and provide adequate net profits.68 Given the small statistical
probability for financial success of any individual release, record com-
panies have the problem of providing minimum compensation to every
artist on their rosters. Arguably, if a musical group has six members,
the record company might have to pay $36,000 minimum compensa-
tion.6 9 Since the costs of promoting an artist are high,70 record compa-
nies will view the Newton-John decision as protection against a
successful artist who attempts to breach a contract.
1. $6000 not adequate minimum compensation
Even if the formal requirements of California Civil Procedure
Code section 526 and California Civil Code section 3423 are met, the
$6,000 requirement is too low. The statutes were enacted in 1919 when
the average annual income in the United States was $1,142. 71 Based on
consumer-index comparisons, $6,000 in 1919 would have about the
pensation requirement than Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000) per annum as a requi-
site for injunctive relief, the aforesaid references to Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000)
shall automatically be deemed amended to such new figure as of the effective date
of such law.
MUSICIAN'S MANUAL, supra note 65, at 178.
67. CHAPPLE & GAROFALO, supra note 46, at 182.
Although there are no exact figures, an album must sell approximately 20,000 copies to
break even (this figure does not take into account the additional promotional costs necessary
to retail the album). DENISOFF, supra note 15, at 203.
Even successful artists do not start making money for the company until approximately
the fourth album. CHAPPLE & GAROFALO, supra note 46, at 174.
A company can easily run up an $800,000 debt supporting a new artist and his coterie.
Wallace, supra note 62, at 10, col. 3.
68. Approximately 4,000 albums and 7,000 singles are released each year. As many as
eighty percent of them fail to make a profit. CHAPPLE & GAROFALO, supra note 46, at 182.
However, the point at which a record company reaches a profit can be disputed. Costs
subtracted from gross receipts include artist advances, manufacturing costs, advertising and
promotional costs, and artist royalties.
69. The issue of whether the statutes require minimum compensation for each and every
member of a group has never been litigated at the appellate level. However, a court is as
likely to preserve the rights of each member of a group as of an individual artist.
70. The cost of producing, promoting, and supporting a new album is between $350,000
and $500,000. See Wallace, supra note 62, at 10, col. 3.
71. THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 164 (1976) (Average Annual
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same value as $21,000 in 1979.72 Passing time has diluted the protec-
tion afforded an artist because he can be subjected to the powerful rem-
edy of a prohibitory injunction with compensation worth five times less
than when the statutes were enacted.
One obvious solution is to increase the amount of minimum com-
pensation to $21,000 and tie future increases of this figure to a con-
sumer price index. This creates a new problem," however, given the
highly speculative nature of the entertainment industry.74 Record com-
panies might be reluctant to sign new artists if they were forced to guar-
antee each artist the minimum compensation of $21,000 per year7
Another important issue is whether a company needs the option of
a prohibitory injunction against an artist to operate successfully. Com-
panies would still be able to sue an artist for breach of contract, or sue
the other company for unfair competition or interference with contrac-
tual obligations. In the latter litigation, the battleground would be
shifted from, hypothetically, Artist v. Old Company to Old Company v.
New Company. Thus, if a new company wants to engage an artist al-
ready under contract, the artist can record for the new company with-
out the threat of injunction. The two record companies would then
litigate among themselves to determine which one was entitled to the
artist's services. Furthermore, record companies can retain their most
successful artists by providing them $21,000 guaranteed compensation
per year.
Earnings of Employees: 1900 to 1970 Table) [hereinafter cited as AvERAon EARNINGS TA-
BLE).
72. CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 47 (1978) (Consumer Price Indexes Table D-
10); AVERAGE EARNINGS TABLE, supra note 71, at 211 (Consumer Price Indexes).
73. A group of economic theorists believe that minimum compensation requirements are
against the best interests of low wage workers. They argue that employers will not hire
employees if it costs them a wage higher than they would normally pay. See J. HIRSH-
LEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 372-76 (1976).
Applied to the record industry, these economists would argue that record companies
would be far less likely to hire new artists, thus depriving them of the chance to be signed at
a low wage and work their way up.
74. See note 68 supra.
75. Civil Code § 3423 and Civil Procedure Code § 526 do not state that each artist must
be paid $6,000 minimum compensation annually. Rather, they state that an employer may
not seek an injunction against an employee who is not so compensated. Therefore, compa-
nies could still sign artists for less than the proposed $21,000 per year. See Minimum Com-
pensation, supra note 16, at 520-28 for a detailed discussion of the problem involving the
minimum compensation requirement.
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III. RESTRICTIONS ON DURATION.OF INJUNCTIONS
A. Section 2855 of the Labor Code
76
Arhong the detailed set of rights and duties contained in the Labor
Code is section 2855, which states that personal service contracts can-
not extend for a term longer than seven years.77 Few artists in the mo-
tion picture, television, and recording industries will sign seven year
contracts. 8
Three issues have been decided by the courts regarding section
28551 (1) the protections of its provisions cannot be waived by an art-
ist;79 (2) an injunction against an artist may not extend beyond seven
years from the date of signing of the original agreement even if there
has been a valid suspension;"0 and (3) if a contract binds an artist for
less than seven years, an injunction may not be issued beyond that pe-
riod even if there has been a valid suspension.8' However, the courts
have not determined the effect subsequent modifications of a contract
have upon the seven year limitation.
2
In De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures,8 3 the first two issues were
resolved. Actress Olivia De Havilland contracted with Warner Bros.
for k one-year term, with a series of six successive one-year options,
exercisable at the discretion of Warner Bros. The contract gave
Warner Bros. the right to suspend the contract if De Havilland failed,
refused or neglected to perform to her full ability.84 During the suspen-
76. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1974):
A contract to render personal service, other than a contract of apprenticeship as
provided in Chapter 4 of this division, may not be enforced beyond seven years
from the commencement of service under it. Any contract, otherwise valid, to
perform or render service of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary, or
intellectual character, which gives it peculiar value and the loss of which can not be
reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an action at law, may
nevertheless be enforced against a person contracting to render such service, for a
term not to exceed seven years from the commencement of service under it. If the
employee voluntarily continues his service under it beyond that time, the contract
may be referred to as affording a presumptive measure of the compensation.
77. Id
7b. Neither the artist nor the company desires such a long-term contract because of an
artistes fluctuating value over time.
79. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944).
80. Id
81. See MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90 Cal. App. 3d 18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153
(1979).
82. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text infra.
83. 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 153 P.2d 983 (1944). For an unknown reason, the official re-
porter misspelled the actress' name which is in fact spelled "De Havilland." See I WHO'S
WHO IN AMERICA 772 (39th ed. 1967-77).
84. The validity of the suspension was not in issue. See note 19 and accompanying text
supra.
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sion periods De Havilland was to receive no compensation. Illness and
De Havilland's refusal to play roles she believed were unsuited fqr her
caused her contract to be suspended for a total of approximately six
months. Warner Bros. did not question her good faith, it merely
wanted to enforce the contract beyond seven years from the date her
services commenced, for a period equivalent to the total of the suspen-
sions.85
The court of appeal rejected Warner Bros.' claim that De Havil-
land could be bound beyond the seven-year period. 6 In addition, the
court rejected Warner Bros.' argument that De Havilland had waived
the rights provided by section 2855 when she agreed to the inclusion of
a suspension clause:
As one grows more experienced and skillful there should be
reasonable opportunity to move upward and employ his abili-
ties to the best advantage and for the highest obtainable com-
pensation. Legislation which is enacted with the object of
promoting the welfare of large classes of workers whose per-
sonal services constitute their means of livelihood and which
is calculated to confer direct or indirect benefits upon the peo-
ple as a whole must be presumed to have been enacted for a
public reason and as an expression of public policy in the field
to which the legislation relates ...
• . . It could scarcely have been the intention of the Leg-
islature to protect employees from the consequences of their
improvident contracts and still leave them free to throw away
the benefits conferred upon them.
7
The court specifically held that De Havilland could not waive her sec-
tion 2855 rights even if she wanted to, refusing to allow her employ-
ment obligation to extend beyond seven years from the original date of
signing.88
However, De Haviland did not resolve all issues with respect to
section 2855. In the entertainment industry, artists frequently seek to
renegotiate terms of personal service contracts to reflect increased stat-
85. 67 Cal. App. 2d at 229, 153 P.2d at 985.
86. Id at 232, 153 P.2d at 986.
87. Id at 235, 237, 153 P.2d at 988, 989.
88. The court cited section 3513 of the California Civil Code when it rejected Warner
Bros. contention of waiver of section 2855: "Anyone may waive the advantage of a 14w
intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contra-
vened by a private agreement." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3513 (West 1970).
The Labor Code expressly provides that any contract or agreement, express or implied,
made by an employee for the purpose of waiving the benefits of article 2, chapter 2, division
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ure achieved during the course of the contract.8 9 During these negotia-
tions, the employer will generally seek to extend the term for which the
performer is obligated under the terms of the contract in return for the
modification that the artist desires. Such a quidpro quo raises the issue
of whether the renegotiation constitutes a novation, starting a new
seven year time period, or whether it is merely a modification of the
original agreement.
A recent arbitration decision involving NBC talk show host
Johnny Carson illustrates the problem but does not resolve it. In April,
1972, Carson signed a seven-year agreement with NBC to host "The
Tonight Show." Subsequently, the parties reached three further agree-
ments providing more money and reduced hours for Carson as host of
the show. Carson claimed that his contract expired in April of 1979,
seven years after the signing of the original agreement. NBC con-
tended that Carson should be bound until April of 1981 because the
new agreements constituted new contracts between the parties.90
Because the parties chose to arbitrate this matter rather than to
litigate," the Carson-NBC dispute did not become a vehicle for an ap-
pellate court to establish a needed precedent in this area.92 It is un-
3 of the Labor Code.(obligation of the employer) is null and void. CAL. LAa. CODE § 2804
(West 1971).
No parallel "non-waiver" provision is in article 4 (termination of employment), the
article of which section 2925 is a part. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra,
However, the court has recognized that the payment of wages is how people survive,
and therefore is a matter of public concern. See, e.g., Kerr's Catering Serv. v. Department
of Indus. Relations, 57 Cal. 2d 319, 369 P.2d 20, 19 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1962); In re Ballestra, 173
Cal. 657, 161 P, 120 (1916).
The rationale has become part of the California Constitution: "The legislature may
provide for minimum wages and for the general welfare of employees and for those pur-
poses may confer'on a commission legislative, executive and judicial powers." CAL. CONST.
art. 14 § I (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
89. See note 2 supra.
Studios and record companies want to avoid losing their stars, and if an artist refuses to
perform his contract, the only available remedy is an injunction. This remedy does the
studio little real good because all the money and resources invested in creating and publiciz-
ing a show is wasted. This was the quandary of Warner Bros. in the Bumgarner case, involv-
ing the Maverick program. See. notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
90. See Family Feud- Carson and NBC Go to Court, TIME, Sept. 24, 1979, at 86.
91. See Minimum Compensation, supra note 16, at 503.
See Comment, Compulsory Judicial Arbitration in Calfiornia: Reducing the Delay and
Expense of Resolving Uncomplicated Civil Disputes, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 481-83 (1978).
The results of an arbitration process are appealable within a limited period following the
arbitrator's decision, so theoretically the case could reach an appeals court.
Arbitration has become.an increasingly popular method to settle disputes in the en-
tertainment arena because arbitration produces speedier resolutions. Id at 478.
92. See text accompanying notes 44 and 51 supra.
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likely a court will get a chance to hear a case of this nature because
immediate settlements such as Carson's are commonplace. Pre-trial
delays and prolonged court battles often render the duration limitation
issue moot, since the contract would have expired by any yardstick.
Perhaps the best safeguard to avoid this problem is to provide expressly
in the new contract that the former contract is terminated, and that the
new contract was entered into for new and different consideration.
Nevertheless, it would be helpful if an appellate court would specifi-
cally address this issue to resolve the current ambiguities.
1. Injunction may only be enforced for the duration of the contract
In the entertainment industry, artists often sign contracts with a
short initial term followed by a series of options. A standard recording
contract is often for a term of one-year followed by a succession of six
one-year options. Disputes between the artist and the employer can
arise at any time during this period. The employer has the right to seek
a prohibitory injunction if it contends that the artist has breached the
contract. If the breach occurs during, say, the second of six options in a
contract, the issue arises whether the injunction may extend only
through the current option period or during all the remaining options
of the contract. The courts have consistently ruled that an employer
may obtain an injunction against an artist for the duration of the
unexpired term of the contract, including all unexercised option peri-
ods.
In Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brode,93 Brodel rendered services dur-
ing her one-year contract period, and during the first three years of the
six one-year option periods. At this point, Brodel reached the age of
majority and attempted to disaffirm the contract. Warner Bros. sought
an injunction to prevent the actress from performing for others. The
trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer and dismissed the ac-
tion,94 but the California Supreme Court reversed.95 Justice Traynor,
writing for the majority, reasoned that the rule of equity permitting an
employer to enjoin an artist during a contract period could be applied
to all unexercised option periods.
96
In MC.4 Records, Inc. v. Newton-John,97 the court of appeal fol-
lowed the reasoning expressed by Justice Traynor in Brodel. The court
93. 31 Cal. 2d 766, 192 P.2d 949 (1948).
94. Id at 770, 192 P.2d at 950-51.
95. Id, 192 P.2d at 951.
96. Id at 773, 192 P.2d at 952-53.
97. 90 Cal. App. 3d 18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1979).
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let stand a preliminary injunction issued by the trial court against
Newton-John. However, it modified the length of the injunction so
that it would not extend beyond the five-year term of the agreement.98
The court rejected Newton-John's claim that an injunction could
not be issued against her because she was suspended.9 9 The court held
that Newton-John was, in fact, not suspended, and could complete her
contrctual obligation whenever she desired.t °°
The view that an injunction can automatically be enforced for the
contract term and all unexercised option periods is not universally held.
The British view was expressed in Warner Bros. Pictures v. Nelson.'?'
In Nelson, the court refused to issue an injunction against acress Bette
Davis for six years, a term which represented her entire contract period
plus all unexercised options. The injunction issued by the court was for
only three years or until performance of the contract resumed, which-
ever was shorter. The court reasoned that an injunction should afford
"reasonable protection and no more to the plaintiffs against the ill ef-
fect to them of the defendant's breach of contract."'
' 0 2
Whether Justice Traynor's view or the British view is superior is
arguable. The British view seems to account more for the equities of
the individual case. It looks to the relative positions of the parties and
makes a judicial value judgment. The Traynor view is more mechani-
cal but assures consistency, something that, as has been noted, is lack-
ing in most of the law relating to personal service contracts involving
artists. Furthermore, given section 2855 of the Labor Code which lim-
its the amount of time a contract may be enforced against an artist,
Traynor's view is more reasonable in a state that limits such enforce-
ment than in a jurisdiction without such safeguards. In California, an
artist knows that an injunction may be issued for the duration of the
contract including the option period, no more and no less. Both parties
know exactly what they have bargained for when they sign the con-
tract.
98. Id at 24, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
One reason that the court limited the term of the injunction was the finding that the
injunction issued by the trial court was merely intended to preserve the status quo between
the parties pending a final judgment. See Lemat Corp v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969).
The language of the court seemed to indicate that an extension of an injunction period
would act as a disincentive for MCA to proceed swiftly through the litigation because the
artist is enjoined from working during the period.
99. Id at 23, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
100. Id
101. 1 K.B. 209 (1937).
102. Id at 221.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The issuance of an injunction against an artist is a powerful rem-
edy. It prevents an artist from working in his chosen profession. How-
ever, when an artist refuses to fulfill his obligations, the company has
few alternatives other than to obtain an injunction preventing the artist
from working for a competitor. In a majority of disputes, the parties
will settle, but that does not solve the problem for those who don't.
Hopefully, the California courts will establish clearer standards in the
future so that all concerned may more fully understand their rights.
Robert Steinberg

